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ABSTRACT 
This paper identifies the multiple processes of capitalist development through which access to 
common property resources and their utility for communities are undermined. Three sites in 
upland Asia demonstrate how patterns of exclusion are mediated by the unique and selective 
trajectories through which capital expands, resulting in a decline of common property 
ecosystems. The process is mediated by both economic stress, ecological degradation and 
political processes such as state sanctioned enclosure. The first case study from Shaoguan, 
South China indicates how rapid capitalist industrialisation has depleted the aquatic resource 
base, undermining the livelihoods of fishing households yet to be absorbed into the urban 
working class. At the second site, in Phu Yen, Vietnam, capitalist development is limited. 
However, indirect articulations between capitalism on the lowlands and the peasant economy 
of the uplands is driving the commercialisation of agriculture and fishing and undermining 
the utility of communal river and lake ecosystems. In the third site, Buxa in West Bengal, 
India, there is only selective capitalist development, although patterns of resource extraction 
established during the colonial period and contemporary neo-liberal ‘conservation’ agendas 
have directly excluded communities from forest resources. Restrictions on access oblige them 
to contribute subsidised labour to local enterprises. The paper thus shows how communities 
which are differentially integrated into the global economy are excluded from natural 
resources through complex means. 
Key words: Common property resources, capitalism, industrialisation, globalisation, 
Vietnam, India, China 
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INTRODUCTION: MECHANISMS OF EXCLUSION FROM COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
Land-poor and marginalised households are disproportionately dependent upon common 
property resources (CPRs) such as forests, reservoirs or rivers to supplement fragile 
livelihoods (Agarwal, 1998; Beck and Ghosh, 2000; Dey, 1997; Luttrell, 2006). In the 
context of neo-liberal globalisation and unprecedented capitalist expansion into peripheral 
regions, there is a trend whereby the utilisation of common property resources by 
marginalised groups is being increasingly constrained on economic, ecological and political 
levels. This has occurred through competition with large-scale industrial users of resources 
with associated ecosystem degradation (Agarwal, 1998; Ho, 2006; Sikor and O'Rourke, 
1996), and through degradation by users themselves for multiple reasons including livelihood 
insecurity (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987), or the demands of a market economy combined 
with the undermining of customary management systems (Hoàng, 2011; Sikor, 2002).  
Access is also constrained through political mechanisms whereby management regimes 
exclude marginal users to pursue a commercial or ‘conservation’ agenda. Exclusion can 
emerge for example, through unequal power relations in planning which culminate in reduced 
access rights amongst marginal users (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; Platteau and Abraham, 2002); or 
the wholesale ‘privatisation’, sometimes termed ‘enclosure’, of common property resources 
(Dey, 1997; Harvey, 2003; Hue, 2008; Hue and Scott, 2007; Parayil and Tong, 1998).  More 
recently, Hall et al (2011), focussing more specifically on land (both common and private), 
identify a more complex range of political power relations through which communities in 
Southeast Asia are excluded from natural resources under capitalist globalisation. These 
include legislative frameworks or access rules, direct coercion, and also the market forces of 
capitalism itself such as the price mechanism. All of these processes are supported by a set of 
legitimating ideologies, often of the state.  
This paper builds upon the above literature to uncover the diverse processes associated with 
capitalist globalisation through which communities are excluded from natural resources, with 
a focus on those which are common property. However, specific links are drawn with the 
unique trajectories of capitalist growth in peripheral regions. There is a tendency for 
scholarship to focus on the unprecedented expansion of capitalism under globalisation, 
signalling an almost inevitable dissolution to pre-capitalist social relations (Sugden, 2013). 
Contemporary scholarship in the field of agrarian change has demonstrated for example, how 
state cut-backs in peripheral economies under neo-liberalism and growing export oriented 
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sub-sectors intensifies differentiation within the peasantry, a pre-cursor to capitalist 
development (Akram-Lodhi, 2007, 2008; Bernstein, 2003; Oya, 2001). Some studies even 
suggest that the drive by capital from more developed regions to locate ‘super-profits’ 
requires differentiation by extra-economic means (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Harvey, 2003; 
Patnaik, 2007). In the contemporary periphery for example, this is characterised by the 
appropriation of land for capitalist investment, often with the support of foreign capital 
(Harvey, 2003) 1.    
This paper seeks to demonstrate how capitalist expansion can be more selective, and does not 
necessarily ‘dissolve’ older economic formations. The latter can persist, yet also articulate 
with capitalism. The paper goes on to show how the contexts in which the rural poor are 
excluded from common property resources under neo-liberal globalisation is equally 
complex, with processes including ecological pressure, economic stress, and unequal political 
power relations, including state sanctioned enclosure. Most significantly, the ways in which 
these processes are constituted is shown to itself be linked to the selective expansion of 
capitalism and persistence of older economic formations.  
A central tenet of the Althusserian tradition of political economy was to identify historical 
individualities of given social formations rather than attempting to fit what is observed into a 
pre-ordained evolutionary framework, in this case driven by a vision of an all powerful, all 
encompassing, capitalism. The underlying dynamics of social transformation can only be 
uncovered through the historical analysis of empirical data for geographically and historically 
specific conjunctures (Raatgever, 1985). A body of literature from sub-Saharan Africa has 
shown how the diversity of pre-capitalist economic formations can lead to considerable 
variation in the trajectories of change which arise from contact with the market (Geschiere 
and Raatgever, 1985, Dupré and Rey, 1979, Meillassoux, 1973). This involves a complex 
interplay between not only economic but political and ideological processes.  A key process 
identified by this scholarship is the articulation of modes of production, (a term initially 
coined by Althusser and Balibar, 1968), whereby capitalism co-exists and articulates with 
                                                 
1 While some of these studies have pointed to a more complex pattern of change with ‘petty commodity 
production’ persisting to serve capitalism (Bernstein, 2003, de Janvry, 1981, Bernstein, 1977), these studies tend 
to imply that these older forms are functionally ‘dependent’ upon capitalism which is always the dominant force 
(see Sugden, 2013). 
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older economic formations. The internal structure of the older mode of production may allow 
it to maintain relative autonomy, even while supplying labour or commodities to capitalism.  
This paper uses elements of this approach, yet considers how these diverse processes of 
capitalist expansion mediate ecological change and acess to natural resources. Furthermore, 
whilst recognising the selective trajectories of capitalist development, this paper does also 
show that market led globalisation has invariably led to a decline in common property 
ecosystems for marginalised communities. The character of this decline however, is shaped 
by the unique mechanisms through which capital expands into localities. The term ‘common 
property resources/ecosystems’, as used in this paper, refers to ecosystems not owned by 
individual households or enterprises, which allow a set of users full or partial access to 
exploit natural resources without payment (Wade, 1987). This should be distinguished from 
‘open access resources’, where there are no pre-defined set of users or rules (Ostrom, 1990; 
Dasgupta, 2008). However, the line between the two is not clear cut, and the degree to which 
the ecosystems described in the paper are ‘regulated’, either formally or informally, is 
variable.  
This paper begins by outlining the methods and political-economic contexts of the study sites 
and goes on to identify these shifting interactions between communities and their 
environments in the context of economic change. 
SITE SELECTION AND METHODS 
This research was part of a multi-partner, multi-disciplinary European Commission funded 
project which analysed aquatic resource use and associated conservation and management 
dilemmas in five upland watersheds of China, Vietnam and India. The three case studies 
chosen for this paper have comparative histories, whereby over the last three centuries, 
coercive state formations have gradually increased their control over land and natural 
resources, shaping the trajectory of livelihoods and nature-society interactions. However, 
during the twentieth century, capitalism has achieved quite different levels of dominance. 
Shaoguan district of South China is a region with a rapidly advancing industrial economy. 
Phu Yen district in northern Vietnam is a remote region with only small-scale proto-capitalist 
development on the valley floor alongside the Song Da reservoir. Buxa in India’s West 
Bengal, lies in the foothills of the Bhutan Himalaya and was long a frontier region where 
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livelihoods depended entirely upon forest and river resources, although it has a more recent 
history of colonial resource extraction.  
The livelihoods element of this project on which this paper is based, included a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative techniques in a process of triangulation in line with the 
project’s interdisciplinary agenda (see www.higharcs.org). At each field site a sample of 
three rural villages were chosen. Field sites and villages were selected by in-country teams on 
the basis that they were dependent on the same aquatic ecosystem (ie. river basin) and were 
located in upland regions. Using a wealth ranking exercise in consultation with local leaders 
and key respondents, a stratified sample of 30 households in each village were selected for an 
in-depth survey, totalling 90 households (30 poor, 30 medium and 30 rich). Quantitative data 
was collected on livelihood activities, sources of income, and asset ownership, followed by 
more open-ended questions. To gain deeper qualitative insights ten focus groups were 
conducted with men, women, girls and boys respectively, totalling forty at each site. 
Participatory techniques were used, including community resource mapping, production of 
historical and annual timelines, and livelihood ranking activities. The quantitative data was 
analysed using SPSS and a thematic analysis was conducted for the qualitative data.  
BACKGROUND TO LIVELIHOODS AND PROCESSES OF CAPITALIST EXPANSION 
 
Shaoguan, China 
Shaoguan, a prefecture level city with a large rural hinterland, lies in Guangdong province in 
South China. The focus of the study was on three villages that traditionally depend on fishing 
along the Bejiang river. Lishi village is at the lower end of the Wujiang River, Kengkou is 
located on the Beijiang River downstream from Shaoguan city, and Zhoutian is upstream (see 
Figure 1). 
One common historical process which has been present in all three field sites has been a 
pattern of feudal subordination2 long before the emergence of socialist or capitalist economic 
formations. Although it is impossible to generalize a complex regionally diverse history, up 
until the mid-twentieth century, the rural economy in China has often been considered feudal 
                                                 
2 The predominant attributes of feudalism alluded to by Marx (1932) include control over land by a minority 
class with political and ideological as well as economic power over a peasant majority and appropriation of 
surplus in kind by rent or usury, often through extra-economic means. 
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in character (see Schwartz, 1954). Although private property rights to land were relatively 
well developed by the eighteenth century and there was an independent peasantry, large 
landlords had significant class power and, alongside a powerful state apparatus, appropriated 
much of the surplus (Feuerwerker, 1984). Through their income from landlordism, the 
bureaucracy, money lending and commerce, they were able to increase their wealth and buy 
up the private plots of individual peasants (Schwartz, 1954)3.  
Guangdong was one of the more developed provinces from the eighteenth century onwards 
(Buoye, 1993). There was a burgeoning commercial sector with an expanding market for land 
and commodities, inter-provincial trade and production of commercial crops. Nevertheless, 
persisting landlordism combined with population growth led to critical land shortages and 
growing disputes between and within the tenant and landlord class (Buoye, 1993). This offers 
some background to the oral histories of the fishers in the Beijiang watershed. Around two 
centuries ago, the ancestors of the fishers of Zhoutian reported that they had been tobacco 
farmers in Shixing county. Due to increasing population and limited land, they migrated to 
the banks of the upper Beijiang river to work as labourers in the river transport sector. In the 
past rivers were crucial routes for the transport of commodities, and large boats would be 
pulled upstream using ropes by groups of labourers. This provided employment to the 
farmers from Shixing. However, when they started families they could not support 
themselves with their meagre earnings, and became dependent upon fish from the Beijiang 
river (Household interview, Zhoutian, July 2010)4. 
The Communist revolution spurred a dramatic structural transformation. Agriculture as well 
as livelihood activities dependent upon common property resources such as fishing were 
transformed according to socialist principles, with fishing cooperatives established in 1958 
(Liu et al., 2011). Households would sell fish to the cooperative and receive payment from 
the government.  
It was only during the 1980s that capitalist industrialisation emerged from within the socialist 
system. Fishing and agriculture were decollectivised, and fields were distributed on a largely 
                                                 
3 In the early twentieth century prior to the Communist victory, Brandt and Sands (1990) estimate that up to a 
third of land was not owned by peasants but rented.   
4 In Lishi and Kengkou villages, the history is less clear, although it was reported that the population of both 
villages also migrated to their present location around two centuries ago from Heyuan city (Household 
interview, Lishi, July 2010) 
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egalitarian manner under a lease system (Eyferth et al., 2003; Luong and Unger, 1998).  
Whilst providing new opportunities for individual generation of wealth, differentiation 
inevitably increased (Luong and Unger, 1998). Although fishing offered few possibilities for 
accumulation, it was reported that up until the 1990s fish stocks were abundant. The river 
could provide a relatively comfortable subsistence. Many fishers diversified their livelihoods 
working in small-scale industries, many of which had previously operated as collectives. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, rapid capitalist industrial development ensued across 
China, bolstered by a strong state apparatus. Provinces such as Guangdong were lead players 
in the new Chinese economy, and Shaoguan (both the urban area and surrounding counties) 
experienced rapid industrialisation.   While in 1978 the secondary (manufacturing) sector in 
Shaoguan was worth just 464,000 Rmb, by 2008 it was worth a staggering 26.256 billion 
Rmb (Luo et al., 2011).   
Today, fishing continues as a key livelihood activity for many households in Lishi, Kengkou 
and Zhoutian. However, there is negligible ‘capitalist’ differentiation within these 
communities, and most fishers can be considered a single ‘class’ in the Marxian sense. There 
are differences in wealth with some households better endowed than others with regards to 
nets and equipment. However, the household survey shows that fishing is not a source of 
‘accumulation’ and fishing incomes have declined significantly since the 1990s. The only 
two households displaying capitalist tendencies and employing labour had diversified into 
new sectors: one operating a commercial pig and fish farm and the other a shoe business. The 
younger generation today are being drawn into an expanding class of capitalist labourers. 
Fishing is today a supplementary source of income, eclipsed by income from work in 
factories both locally and nearby cities (see Figure 2).  Household members are thus engaged 
in a pre-capitalist economic formation based upon subsistence fisheries which is in rapid 
decline, while simultaneously labouring in the capitalist sector. 
 
Phu Yen, Vietnam 
Phu Yen, in the west of Son La province, is the district where three villages in two communes 
were selected for the research, Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien (see Figure 3). The valley is 
culturally diverse, with a predominant population of the Muong and Thai minority on the 
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lower slopes and valley floor, while smaller H’mong communities reside in villages on the 
higher slopes.   
Unlike Shaoguan, the minorities of remote Son La province were historically at the margins 
of state control, particularly in the pre-colonial period. Sets of villages or muangs operated as 
relatively autonomous units ruled over by a phiia or chief (Sikor, 2001b; Hoàng, 2011). 
Interestingly, all land could be considered the common property of the muang, although there 
was a complex management regime with the level of regulation varying according to the land 
type. Hoàng’s (2011) study from the Thai communities in the Phu Yen valley notes that the 
most important wet rice land was controlled by the community, with plots being allocated for 
a period of time according to household need. Upland fields for shifting cultivation could be 
claimed from the forest and households maintained the right to collect forest products, and 
thus the rules for exploiting these resources were more open, so long as one was not from 
outside the muang. Although land was held communally, Hoàng’s study from Phu Yen and 
Sikor’s (2004) from nearby Yen Chau district, show that hierarchies still existed. The phiia 
was considered the symbolic owner, with control over the production process including the 
allocation of plots of paddy land, rights to collect a share of paddy as tax before it was 
distributed, and rights to personal plots of the best land.   
With the onset of French colonialism, rather than implanting capitalism, it served to reinforce 
pre-capitalist inequalities (Dao, 1993). For example, in neighbouring Yen Chau, Sikor (2004) 
notes how The French demanded large taxes and corvée labour contributions from the Black 
Thai leaders, a burden which was passed on to the peasantry (Sikor, 2004). This parallels oral 
histories in Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien.  One elder Thai respondent recalled that after planting 
rice, corn and cassava, local people were obliged to give a share as tax directly to local 
leaders. These intermediary tax collectors became de facto land owners, channelling revenue 
to the French colonial regime while retaining a portion for personal use, and employing their 
poorer counterparts as sharecroppers (Household interview, Tuong Tien, April 2010).   
Following independence from the French in the 1950s, the new communist government 
pursued land redistribution from large landlords to landless peasants (Kerkvliet, 2006; Sikor 
and Truong, 2002). This was followed by a policy of collectivization, whereby land, labour 
and other resources were shared (Sikor, 2001a), once again as a highly regulated common 
property regime. Wet rice lands were administered by the newly created communes, and as in 
China, households worked together for points according to labour hours, which were 
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converted into shares of food and money. Households continued to independently farm 
cassava and other crops on the wooded upper slopes as in the past, although state regulations 
increasingly sought to limit the size of fields and discourage shifting cultivation (Fieldnotes, 
April 2010).  Sikor (2004) notes however that regulations for the use of upland forest land in 
the northern highlands were not strongly enforced, particularly as forests were placed under 
state control, undermining traditional management institutions (Hoàng, 2011). Nevertheless, 
Folving and Christensen (2007), in a study from two nearby communes in Phu Yen, 
suggested there were well defined systems of customary tenure within the community that 
determined which land could be cleared by families. Respondents in Tuong Ha commented 
that extensive tracts of forest land remained intact during the communist period, suggesting 
the uplands were managed sustainably. It therefore could not be considered as ‘open access’.  
From the 1980s, external interventions by the state prompted considerable transformations to 
the livelihoods of the valley. Between 1986 and 1989 households moved to higher ground to 
make way for a new reservoir which would flood the valley following the construction of the 
Soviet funded Hoa Binh dam downstream. A large portion of the most fertile rice land was 
lost under water permanently, while some land was now flooded seasonally, allowing just 
one rice harvest. This reservoir however, represented a new common property ecosystem, and 
fishing activities were increasingly promoted and supported through the government’s Project 
747 (Do et al., 2011). By the late 1980s, economic problems facing the cooperative farms, 
combined with a growing influence of neo-liberalism, led to a government policy of 
liberalization or doi moi, literally ‘renovation’ (Hue, 2008). This resulted in the de-
collectivisation of agriculture, which finally paved the way for capitalist penetration.   
While capitalist agricultural development and industrialisation accelerated in lowland 
Vietnam, with differentiation and intensified class inequalities (Akram-Lodhi, 2005; Hue and 
Scott, 2007), the character of capitalist expansion was more selective in the isolated 
communities of Phu Yen. Although there were no large-scale capitalist farms or industries as 
in Shaoguan, small-scale cash crop production has developed, providing corn and cassava for 
sale in lowland urban centres. Income is also generated through the sale of reservoir 
resources and lowland traders visit the commune daily to collect shrimp to take to the plains. 
However, unlike in Shaoguan where fishers have no involvement in agriculture, the 
households in Phu Yen simultaneously fish in the reservoir, while producing commercial 
crops on upland fields and grain staples on lower slopes.  Figure 4 shows that out of the 
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sampled households, income from fish and crop sales are on average the most important 
source of income by far. Although supplying produce to capitalist markets, the household 
remains the predominant unit of production, and pre-capitalist patterns of subsistence peasant 
farming persist alongside commercial activities. 
The root of these articulations between the peasant economy of the uplands and the capitalist 
markets of the lowlands evidently lie in growing cash demands and indebtedness associated 
with the liberalisation process. Interviews revealed that in the collective era the communes 
were able to retain a degree of self-sufficiency. However, following liberalisation cash needs 
had expanded considerably for various reasons. Firstly, local people now had access to 
commodity markets as restrictions on inter-provincial trade were lifted as part of the 
liberalisation process. Coupled with an expansion of the transport network, traders could now 
purchase agricultural produce to transport to the lowlands, while bringing in consumer goods 
(Sikor and Vi, 2005). In this context households displayed a desire to invest in luxury 
consumer goods such as televisions, fridges and mobile phones which are often beyond their 
usual purchasing power (see also Hoàng, 2011), as well as in expensive upgrades to houses 
(see Figure 5). Secondly, in the transition to a market economy, cash was now needed for 
social services which were once provided by the state such as education and healthcare (see 
Figure 5). The combination of easily available low interest credit from micro-finance banks 
and high expenditure has intensified cycles of indebtedness, to banks as well as to an 
emerging class of local money lenders. Thirdly, prior to the building of the dam and the 
flooding of the valley, most households could meet their grain staple needs through rice 
farming but now families need cash to buy rice. The cumulative effect of growing cash needs 
is the expansion of cash crop production on upper slopes and fishing.   
Buxa, India 
Buxa is a forested region in the Dooars, the forest belt of West Bengal’s Jalpaiguri district in 
Kalchini subdivision, where the Siwalik range of Himalayan foothills meets the plains. Today 
it is home to the Buxa Tiger Reserve, a protected region of rich forest and aquatic 
biodiversity. Three village clusters were focussed on for the study: Buxa Fort consists of 
small settlements in the hills around a ruined colonial era fort. Adma is a remote set of 
hamlets in the valleys to the west, and Jayanti, lies on the gentle alluvial slope where the hills 
meet the plains (see Figure 6).   
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Phu Yen and Buxa share similar histories, both being frontier regions home to minority 
communities, with limited state influence. The predominant population of the Buxa plains 
was of indigenous communities such as the Meche and Garo, while the hilly tract was home 
to Dukpa (the majority ethnic group in Bhutan) who were later joined by the migration of 
Nepali communities such as the Limbus and Magar (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). Across the 
North Bengal frontier, agriculture was characterised by shifting cultivation or jhum by the 
indigenous communities who lived in small settlements, led by a Mandal or headman (Ray, 
2002). The uncultivated forest lands and rivers were extensive, and were largely common 
property rather than being owned by individual households (Ray, 2002). Although there was 
limited centralised regulation of these resources, it would be wrong to term them ‘open 
access’, as indigenous communities may have had their own system of rules within localities.   
As had occurred across South and Southeast Asia, the imposition of centralised state 
formations had a lasting impact on indigenous modes of production. One of the first 
significant states was that of Bhutan. When the entire Dooars region was annexed in the 
1700s, Bhutan enforced its authority over forest dwelling communities through requiring 
them to provide labour service as well as taxes on the use of irrigation channels, on plying 
boats, on weaving looms and on squatting in the jungle (Chaudhuri, 1995; Ray, 2002). In the 
lowlands, the Bhutanese encouraged settlement and land reclamation from the forest (Ray, 
2002). Enterprising peasants from the south, or jotedars, were given incentives to clear the 
jungle and bring in tenants to farm under feudal relations (Chaudhuri, 1995). This process 
saw the slow contraction of the forest frontier, although much of the Buxa population 
remained sparse and free from state control, with livelihoods dominated by shifting 
cultivation (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). In this context, many forest resources informally 
remained as common property, even though land was being increasingly parcelled up 
amongst the new rulers. 
After the Anglo-Bhutan war in 1846, the British colonial state annexed the Dooars from 
Bhutan, and by the late nineteenth century, the influence of capitalism increased through the 
coercive mechanisms of the state. On the edge of Buxa forest in regions already under 
permanent cultivation, rather than seeking to impose capitalist social relations, the British 
formalised the existing hierarchy of jotedars and their tenants, the chukanidars and adhiyars 
(Ray, 2002). By preserving this hierarchy and the right to sub-let land, the clearing of forest 
could be accelerated, while the expansion of colonial control could be facilitated (Chaudhuri, 
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1995). While in Phu Yen of Vietnam, capitalism had a more limited impact on livelihoods 
during the colonial period, the British colonialists in Bengal recognised the potential of the 
resource rich Dooars for commercial forestry and tea production, and by the late nineteenth 
century, finance capital expanded into the region as European companies set up plantations 
on the forest fringe (Ray, 2002). Paralleling trends across North Bengal and Assam, the 
British encouraged the migration of adivasi (indigenous) groups from central India to meet 
labour shortages (Grunning, 2007 [1911]).  
Across the Dooars, many former forest dwelling communities were now working as landless 
tenants for new jotedar settlers under semi-feudal relations of production (Chaudhuri, 1995; 
Ray, 2002), although within the Buxa jungle itself communities continued to follow 
indigenous livelihood patterns. However, the wooded area was shrinking with the expansion 
of new jotedar estates, tea cultivation, and indiscriminate felling by timber traders. The 
colonial state was increasingly concerned with securing strategically important timber 
supplies (Banerjee et al., 2010) for the expansion of railway networks and to supply boxes for 
the tea industry (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). It was in this context that new legislation had a 
lasting impact upon the remaining communities of forest dwellers.   
The Forest Act, which forms the basis of contemporary legislation, was implemented in 1865.  
The Act appointed a settlement officer to look into the ‘claims’ of users and decided which 
forests should be put under state control. Land in Jalpaiguri district was now classified into 
three categories: agricultural land, tea garden, and reserved forest (Bhowmik, 1988). Colonial 
sources indicate that by 1879, 280 square miles of country had been declared as reserved 
forest in Jalpaiguri district, encompassing much of the Buxa region (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). 
The Forest Act not only prohibited the expansion of cultivation in land classified as ‘reserved 
forest’, but it essentially gave the state legal backing to extinguish pre-existing informal 
rights of local people to forest resources with limited negotiation (Banerjee et al., 2010). The 
pre-existing rights, which were now criminalised, included agricultural and livelihood 
activities such as shifting cultivation, hunting and the collection of firewood and non-timber 
forest products. State run forestry enterprises were given monopoly over resource extraction 
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operations and the sale of timber to the markets of Kolkata and Dhaka proved highly 
profitable5 (Grunning, 2007 [1911]).   
The restrictions on access to forest lands meant forest dwellers could no longer meet their 
subsistence needs through agriculture. Forest enterprises had a valuable opportunity to exploit 
this destitution. ‘Forest villages’ were specifically set up to provide a labour force for forestry 
operations across Jalpaiguri district (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). Small plots of land were 
distributed to former jungle dwellers as well as migrants, who were expected to cultivate sal 
and teak monocultures alongside subsistence plots. In return for the right to reside in the 
forest they were obliged to provide un-waged labour or begar to the Forest Department’s 
operations (Banerjee et al., 2010), in a bonded labour relationship. Jayanti was set up as one 
of these ‘forest villages’, and being at the foot of the mineral rich Siwalik hills, it was also 
home to a dolomite mine and processing factory. Nepali, Bengali and adivasi labourers from 
the surrounding estates and agricultural land were brought in to work in the mine, expanding 
the settlement’s population. Despite the criminalisation of forest-based livelihoods, most 
communities had no option but to continue to use the jungle for small-scale agriculture, 
collection of forest produce, herding and fishing in order to subsist. Paradoxically, these pre-
capitalist livelihood activities ensured the reproduction of a cheap labour force for the forest 
villages6. 
The primary difference with Vietnam and China in the second half of the twentieth century 
was that the colonial economy of India essentially remained in place, despite the transition to 
home rule. There was no ‘socialist’ revolution. There was some emerging capitalist industry 
in urban centres, but in the Dooars, the primary sector based colonial economy of tea 
production, forestry and mining coexisted with a pre-capitalist sector of small-scale peasant 
farming and older forest-based activities, which provided it with labour (see Sugden, 2010). 
Begar obligations were abolished in the 1960s following considerable agitation by forest 
dwelling communities (Banerjee et al., 2010). However, the Forest Department still restricted 
livelihoods, and households were obliged to provide low wage labour to both the Forest 
Department, the dolomite mine, and contractors involved in activities such as stone collecting 
                                                 
5 The net profit in Buxa division increased from Rs 6,093 in 1900-01 to Rs 99,673 by 1907-08 (Grunning, 2007 
[1911]) 
6 In other words, some of the subsistence needs are met through pre-capitalist activities, allowing lower wages to 
be paid, a process noted in Sugden (2013). 
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on the Jayanti river. Use of the forest was tolerated by the state to a limited extent, as this was 
the only means through which labour could be reproduced and wages remain low.  
Participation in the capitalist sector therefore was not through commercial agriculture and 
commoditisation as in Phu Yen, but through the supply of low wage labour, mediated by the 
coercive mechanisms of the colonial and post-colonial state. It is important however to note 
that as with Phu Yen, the older pre-capitalist livelihoods grounded in natural resource 
dependent activities persisted alongside wage labour. In this context, far from capitalism 
dissolving these older formations, it in part perpetuates them as they provide capitalism with 
a source of surplus. 
CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALISATION, ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE AND THE EXPANDING WORKING CLASS 
This paper now considers how common property resource based livelihoods have fared under 
these three different trajectories of capitalist expansion. The first identified process through 
which common property resource based livelihoods are undermined is due to ecological 
change, whereby small scale users come into competition with large-scale industrial users 
who deplete ecosystems or render them unusable. Inevitably, these phenomena are associated 
with regions undergoing rapid industrialisation such as China and Vietnam. In China for 
example, aside from large scale deforestation7, industrial and urban pollution has led to a 
situation whereby 25,000km of rivers did not meet the water quality standards necessary for 
aquatic life as of 2004, while  irrigating land with polluted water is estimated to cost the 
economy 7 billion Renminbi a year (World Bank and SEPA, 2007). Industrial development 
and large-scale commercial agriculture and fisheries production have also undermined 
ecosystems in parts of Vietnam (Sikor and O'Rourke, 1996). However, in this study, given 
the relative isolation of Phu Yen, it is in Shaoguan, China where these processes are most 
visible. In fact, the Shaoguan fishers’ gradual assimilation into the working class is intricately 
connected with growing competition with industrial users of the Beijiang river (Liu et al., 
2011).   
The river remains a common property resource allowing fishing without payment. There are a 
series of constantly evolving government programmes to regulate the use of water resources 
in the basin (so it cannot be considered ‘open access’), although laws regulating the activities 
                                                 
7 Between the 1984-88 and 1989-93 inventories, forest cover was found to have decreased by 4.54 million 
hectares and a further 1.23 million hectares by 1994-1998 (Ho, 2006). 
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of fishers have only a limited impact on fishers’ livelihoods. The licensing system stipulates 
the number of boats and engine sizes, but there are no regulations on the types of fishing 
equipment, and fishing without a licence is tolerated (Jiang et al., 2011). The fishers’ use of 
this common property ecosystem therefore has not been undermined through direct exclusion 
or ‘enclosure’, but as a result of the gradual, yet severe, degradation of the natural resource 
base.   
The annual fish harvest from the Beijiang river reached 8,000 tons in the 1950s, including 
many high value and rare local species. Since 2000 however, the annual fishing production 
has not exceeded 2,000 tons, and most fish caught are lower value species (Jiang et al., 2011).  
The degradation of the river ecosystem is intricately connected with unprecedented industrial 
expansion. Firstly, sand mining, which was mechanised in the mid-1990s, has mushroomed, 
providing materials for the burgeoning urban construction sector. It has changed the structure 
of the river bed, and has influenced the hydrological regime and sand silt characteristics.  
Some river banks have collapsed, the water level has dropped markedly in some locations, 
blocking the movement of boats, while other channels have become narrow (Han et al., 2005; 
Qian, 2004). It has also influenced nutrient cycling and has altered the ecosystem of fish. In 
Zhoutian for example, the fishers noted it had caused a decline in water grasses, impacting 
fish breeding.   
Secondly, water pollution has caused the biological accumulation of toxic material across the 
food chain.  In the past, the fishers reported that they used to swim in the river, but now it 
would cause them to fall sick. Some respondents stated that fish had a diesel oil taste, 
lowering their value. Sources of pollution include effluent from industries, such as the iron 
mine near Kengkou village, and diesel leakage from transport barges or sand mining boats, 
not to mention urban waste. Respondents recalled how growing urban prosperity has meant 
people buy many more manufactured products, the packaging of which can end up in the 
river.  
Finally, hydropower developments have had a significant impact on fish stocks. The 
utilizable hydropower in the Beijiang watershed reaches 1,474,000 kW and there are 1,989 
small-scale hydropower stations (Jiang et al., 2011). The construction of dams, both large and 
small, has changed the ecological structure, such as the hydrology, water quality, sediment 
levels and quantities of aquatic organisms. Furthermore, dams limit the migration of fish, and 
when the dam is opened, many fish are lost by being washed downstream.  On an economic 
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level, the deeper water means fishers have had to change their nets, and the dam’s location 
restricts where they can take their boats.   
Interestingly, management regimes for industries exist, including pollution discharge fees and 
water environment standards and monitoring (Jiang et al., 2011). Furthermore, pollutant 
discharging enterprises are supposed to be strictly controlled in terms of the quality, 
concentration and volume of waste which is released into rivers. Nevertheless, analysis with 
stakeholders suggest that laws are poorly implemented, reminding one that there is not  a 
clear cut difference between regulated ‘common property’ and ‘open access’ resources. 
Firstly, despite sharing authority in water governance, there is limited coordination for 
monitoring between different government agencies such as environment, construction, 
agriculture, geology and mining, fisheries and shipping. This allows some enterprises to 
bypass regulations, whilst impeding the introduction of new rules. For example, the 
Shaoguan Fisheries Agency consulted hydropower dams on the feasibility of charging them 
fishery resources compensation tax in 2004 and 2006, but due to the lack of authorization 
from formal legislation, the agency did not have the power to follow this up. There is also a 
lack of coordination between different administrative zones, and the legal responsibility of 
upstream enterprises whose pollution affects downstream regions remains unclear. Secondly, 
many rules are perceived as ambiguous, and legal loopholes have allowed some dams in the 
Shaoguan district to bypass the need to perform an Environmental Impact Assessment (Jiang 
et al., 2011). 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, are the power relations associated with capitalist 
expansion and the mediating role of the state. There was a strong perception within the 
fishing communities that corporations had the power to avoid regulations, or that they were 
of such economic importance that the state turned a blind eye. With sand mining in particular, 
arguably the most destructive use of the river, we discussed options for more effective 
regulations with fishers. However, respondents dismissed our ideas believing it would be 
impossible to control their activities. They felt the root cause of this problem was that local 
government leaders are only in office for four years, so they concentrate on maximizing short 
term economic growth; even though they know sand mining is destructive.   
Interestingly, farmers reportedly received compensation from sand mining companies due to 
the damage to river banks adjacent to villages, while fishers received nothing. Luong and 
Unger (1998) suggest that in the post reform period, an important axis of differentiation 
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alongside one’s access to capital, is one’s political authority, or position in the ‘bureaucratic 
rank order’. Well connected peasant households are able to build up effective patronage 
networks with local officials, offering opportunities for wealth accumulation (Luong and 
Unger, 1998; Yan, 1992). The farming population is not only significant, but they are an 
important lobby group. Fishers recalled in interviews that if farmers had not received 
compensation from the sand miners, they would probably have put pressure on the state to 
control their activities. In contrast, in fishing communities, there is little involvement in 
politics and they do not have any formal representation as a community. The lack of political 
power in the hands of fishers perhaps partially explains why their alienation from the means 
of production (the river) and absorption into the urban working class is proceeding at a much 
faster pace than that of their farmer counterparts. 
In sum, ecological decline and unequal political power relations in the management of river 
resources has meant that fishing is no longer sufficient to meet households’ subsistence 
needs.  As Figure 2 suggests, households are increasingly dependent upon the labouring 
income provided by sons and daughters. The closure of smaller local enterprises in recent 
years with the rise of larger scale factories in cities mean migration for work is increasing 
(Fieldnotes, July 2010). Payment for factory work is around 1000-1200 Rmb ($152-$181) per 
month for a 9-10 hour day (Household interview, Lishi, August 2010). Most concurred that it 
was difficult to support a nuclear family on this income in urban China, let alone the 
extended family. Therefore, despite falling catches and destruction of the ecosystem, fishing 
remains a crucial source of subsistence for the older generation, particularly given the limited 
welfare provision under a liberalised economy. There are also limited opportunities for the 
older generation to join the urban labour force (Sugden and Punch, 2013). Some perceive 
they lack the necessary skills: ‘We are old and do not know anything, nobody need us (in the 
city)’ (Men’s Focus group, Kengkou, August 2010). Whilst today small scale fishing, a 
remnant of an older pre-capitalist economic formation, ‘subsidises’ the labour of the urban 
capitalist economy by providing for the older generation, the future prospects for this 
livelihood activity remain limited. 
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COMMERCIALISATION OF PEASANT PRODUCTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE  
 
Whilst fishers in Shaoguan face environmental decline from rapid industrialisation, in regions 
lacking significant capitalist development, degradation and ecological change can be due to 
over-use by small-scale users themselves. In upland regions of Vietnam this phenomena still 
has an intricate association with the dynamics of capitalist expansion, as older economic 
formations –  under stress from economic liberalisation and growing cash needs – articulate 
with capitalism through unsustainable patterns of cash crop production and fishing. At the 
same time growing inequalities in a market economy often oblige land poor households to 
intensify the extraction of natural resources (Sikor, 2002, 2004). 
In the case study from Phu Yen, the expansion of cash crop production discussed above, 
under the pressures of a market economy, has led to a significant reduction in the size of 
forest ecosystems which were once the common property of communities (Do et al., 2011). 
This parallels trends across Vietnam. Between 2000 and 2005, the coverage of primary forest 
across the country declined by 14.59%, at the rate of 20,000 ha per year. Between 2005 and 
2010 this had levelled off, yet forest cover still declined by 1.21% in this period (FAO, 
2010)8. Although the land allocation acts of the 1990s solidified ownership to fixed private 
upland fields on the forested slopes in Tuong Ha, demarcation was reportedly poorly 
enforced. The demand for cash which had driven the expansion of corn production has led to 
a significant increase in the cultivated area in the years following decollectivisation as 
households ‘claimed’ fields from the forest as private holdings (Focus groups, Tuong Ha, 
March 2010). Hoàng (2011) notes that the state in Phu Yen district was not able to control 
forest use as effectively as the customary management systems of the past. The elimination of 
indigenous institutions combined with economic liberalisation had thus aggravated 
deforestation since the 1980s9. 
Nowadays, regulations are more strictly enforced by the commune. The richest forest land 
has been set aside as protected forest, where local people have limited access rights (Focus 
                                                 
8 Although there was an increase in planted forests, cover only rose by 6.39% for 2000-2005, and 4.68% for 
2005-2000. 
9 In Hoàng’s (2011) study from further upstream in the Phu Yen valley, deforestation is primarily due to the 
demand for high value timber produce in the lowlands rather than demand for land to grow cash crops, although 
the process of rising cash needs amongst the local population is the same.  
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groups, Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien, April 2010). Households have also been given two 
hectares each of upland to develop into ‘managed’ forests, although the quality of the land 
and productivity of forestry is poor and requires a capital investment out of reach for poorer 
households.   
The massive reduction in primary forest cover, combined with strict regulations on the use of 
remaining forest has made the shifting cultivation of the past virtually impossible. Land can 
no longer be left fallow for long periods, reducing natural fertility, while deforestation has led 
to significant soil run-off. Many of the H’mong community from above Tuong Ha have 
migrated to Moc Chau district to locate better agricultural land (Household interview, Dan-1, 
April 2010). Many of the local Thai and Muong however, have become more dependent upon 
fishing, which offers more secure returns than agriculture, taking loans to invest in boats and 
equipment. Paradoxically, at the same time, increased soil erosion in the watershed has 
undermined the quality of the main remaining common property ecosystem, the reservoir. 
Local people reported in interviews that post-rain run-off from surrounding deforested 
hillsides has caused the water which was once ‘clear’ to become cloudy, increasing water 
turbidity and undermining fish reproduction.   
Although the intensification of fishing has brought short-term benefits and boosted the local 
economy, there is a perception that stocks have been falling, with certain species such as eel, 
turtles, and a cat fish known as cá quât, being rarely seen nowadays. Lift nets, which catch a 
large number of baby fish, are viewed as particularly destructive (Fieldnotes, April 2010). 
This is understandable given that the reservoir remains virtually an open access resource. 
There are limited state enforced rules regulating fishing and no restrictions on households 
from outside the area coming to fish in the reservoir10.  
While it is evident in Phu Yen that articulations between a peasant economy and capitalism 
are undermining common property ecosystems, the growing inequalities in such regions 
which are yet to experience full capitalist development, add a new dimension. As Sikor and 
Nguyen (2007) argue with reference to Vietnam’s Central Highlands, whether or not one can 
benefit from environmental resources is often dependent upon one’s political and economic 
                                                 
10 There was also no evidence of the emergence of indigenous institutions regulating fishing as were present for 
the use of common lands in the past. This is unsurprising given that the number of users was high. There were a 
large number of fishers coming from a wide area, making it difficult to develop or enforce rules (see Ostrom, 
1990). 
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resources. This is an important issue in the context of environmental decline. The one 
ecosystem which retains its use value in Phu Yen is the reservoir. However, as the aquatic 
natural resource base declines, benefits are increasingly cornered by the wealthier households 
with access to capital, despite the fact that poorer households are arguably more dependent 
upon it. Utilising their income from other capital intensive activities such as aquaculture and 
livestock raising, richer households can afford to invest in equipment such as motorised boats 
and larger seine nets.   
Only three households categorised as ‘poor’ in the wealth ranking own more expensive wood 
or metal boats, as opposed to seven households in the ‘rich’ category and seven from the 
‘medium’ category. Poorer households are more likely to fish only using small boats and 
more simple technologies such as shrimp traps. The boats used to lay and collect traps can be 
built for around 300,000 VND ($15), while traps are often given in advance by intermediaries 
who later buy the catch, inevitably reducing the fisher’s bargaining power at the time of sale. 
For such households, fishing can only be done for six months a year when the water level is 
high in the vicinity of the village. Their wealthier counterparts however can travel to distant 
parts of the reservoir year round to locate the richest fish stocks, something particularly 
important given the fragile natural resource base. It is important to note that these wealthier 
fisher/farmers cannot yet be considered a ‘capitalist’ class. There is little evidence of 
significant accumulation of wealth and much labour is still carried out by the household 
members themselves, suggesting the peasant economic formation is not in decline. 
Nevertheless, the process of differentiation in access to natural resources is intricately tied to 
the emerging articulations with the capitalist economy of the lowlands which provides new 
(albeit limited) opportunities for wealth generation. 
NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION, ‘CONSERVATION’ AND ENCLOSURE 
The third process through which communities are marginalised from common property 
ecosystems is via conservation driven enclosure, a process which occurs not due to ecological 
or internal economic stress, but due to externally imposed intervention on a political level. 
Already it has been shown that in Buxa, India, the colonial and post-colonial state directly 
restricted access to forests to protect reserves of timber and create a captive labour force. The 
enclosure of common property resources for commercial exploitation is widespread under 
neo-liberalism in post-colonial economies driven by natural resource extraction (see for 
example, Nguiffo, 1998). This further undermines fragile ecosystems as short-term profit 
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outweighs considerations of the long-term environmental impact. It can also worsen 
degradation by users themselves. Like in Phu Yen, over-use by marginalised communities is 
often worsened on land which has not yet been privatised (Ho, 2006; Johnson, 2004; Parayil 
and Tong, 1998; Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). 
In Buxa, the process of enclosure has taken on a more complex character in recent years as 
‘conservation’ has taken precedent over resource extraction. While essential for protecting 
biodiversity, conservation is also instrumental to capitalist growth (Brockington and Duffy, 
2010). On one level, conservation has been argued to have ‘ideological’ power, associated 
with the commoditised images of nature and romanticised wilderness (Brockington and 
Duffy, 2010). This ideology can be connected to expanding sectors under neo-liberal 
globalisation, such as tourism (Duffy and Moore, 2010). On another level, conservation 
offers more explicit material gains to capital through, for example, the profits in protecting 
genetic resources (Brockington and Duffy, 2010). Furthermore, restrictions on livelihoods 
can provide new sources of surplus through creating a captive labour force no longer able to 
meet their subsistence needs through forest-based activities alone (Sodikoff, 2007; 2009) – a 
process already established in Buxa by forest protection laws with an extractive orientation. 
The use of conservation as a justification for controlling access to ecosystems became 
widespread only in the early 1970s (Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). Buxa was declared a 
Tiger Reserve in the 1980s, paralleling clampdowns on forest use across West Bengal. In the 
state, 5,032 people were arrested collecting firewood and non-timber forest products in 1996-
7 (Banerjee et al., 2010). The dolomite mine was closed in the 1980s, and the railway which 
once served it fell into disrepair. Today, the forest department is seeking to entirely evict 
inhabitants of many forest villages, particularly from ‘enclave villages’ such as Jayanti, deep 
in the forest (Banerjee et al., 2010). Across India, 2,904 families have been displaced since 
the inception of Project Tiger in the 1970s (Kabra, 2009).   
Forest dwellers continued however, to reside in the newly designated tiger reserve, although 
severe restrictions on access to forest resources remained in place, and there was a deep sense 
of mistrust towards the forest authorities and a resentment of its policies. The sentiments 
were echoed during a focus group in Buxa cluster: ‘we love nature, we love the forest, but we 
do not need the Forest Department’, following which there was a round of applause.  
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This could indicate a changed character of capitalist infiltration. While there has been a 
decline in revenue generating forestry operations, enclosure for conservation has still served 
the interests of the capitalist sector. The subjugation of older modes of production to 
capitalism in the context of ecosystem enclosure are very similar to the colonial and post-
colonial periods which were driven by efficient resource exploitation. On the one hand, 
households displaced from the reserve are still likely to create an easily exploited labour force 
with limited resources (Kabra, 2009). On the other hand, for those who remain in the forest 
and on its fringe, the stricter forest laws reproduce the economic insecurities which have been 
drawing households into the labour force since colonial times. 
In the context of an aggressive conservation agenda, it is only in the very remote cluster of 
Adma that forest-based livelihoods are nearly sufficient for households’ subsistence needs, 
and continue to follow long established patterns. Livelihoods include limited cultivation, 
herding in the forest and the raising of livestock in temporary pastures. In many ways its 
remoteness from state control allows the pre-capitalist mode of production to persist with a 
level of autonomy not present elsewhere. In the main villages of Buxa Fort and Jayanti 
cluster however, forest department restrictions mean that pre-capitalist natural resource based 
livelihoods persist, but they are rarely sufficient alone for subsistence, and labouring remains 
a primary source of income. 
While the move towards a conservation agenda has reportedly caused a decline in forest 
based wage labour, it is evident in Figure 7 that households have simply diverted their labour 
to new sectors of the capitalist economy, particularly the burgeoning construction sector in 
growing urban centres. There is today a considerable amount of seasonal out-migration11 to 
cities such as Kolkata, Siliguri and Delhi, while some of the Drukpa community who are 
familiar with the language and culture regularly migrate to Bhutan for construction work, 
although they lack citizenship papers so can only secure menial employment. ‘Other labour’ 
in Figure 7 includes jobs associated with the conservation enterprise itself: portering goods 
for forest officials and maintaining trails for forest guards (Sodikoff, 2007). This labour is 
partially subsidised by agriculture, livestock rearing and gathering, which perhaps explains 
why some forest-based livelihoods are tolerated.  
                                                 
11 Note that most seasonal migrant labour is classified as ‘wage work’ in Figure 12. ‘Income from 
family members living outside’ generally refers to remittances from longer term migrants. 
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Resource extraction by more powerful actors is still allowed in the reserve, a process 
observed in other protected regions of India (Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). The 
collection of rocks from the river in Jayanti is one example, and many of the local people 
labour for urban contractors. In fact, across India between 1980 and 2003, the government 
approved forest land use ‘diversion’ of an area of 7,903 ha of forest in which 5,888 ha were 
allocated for boulder collection (Banerjee et al., 2010). Tourism development also has 
increased considerably over the last decade, absorbing some local labour in the numerous 
guesthouses along the river bank in Jayanti, a site of natural beauty and a prime spot for 
viewing animals. There are contradictory processes at play with regards to these two sectors. 
While rock collecting had previously been banned, it was permitted again in recent years. 
Similarly, the government has recently sought to restrict tourist access to the reserve, despite 
Buxa being a key attraction in tourism promotional campaigns for the Dooars. This suggests 
that there are different interests within the state promoting not only ‘conservation’, but also 
tourism and the more traditional colonial agenda of resource extraction.   
This case study illustrates that so long as the state tolerates the presence of forest dwellers 
following highly restricted livelihood patterns, a supply of cheap labour for the plantation and 
forestry based capitalist sector in North Bengal region will continue to be provided.  The 
forest is converted into a ‘partial’ common property resource, whereby some level of use is 
tolerated, but only to the levels that communities are still obliged to enter the labour force to 
meet the remainder of their subsistence needs. By retaining a limited pre-capitalist mode of 
production grounded in small-scale agriculture, fishing and non-timber resource harvesting, 
labour is ‘subsidised’ and wages can remain low. Sodikoff (2007) suggests that conservation 
involves an interesting contradictory process, whereby forest-based livelihoods continue to be 
tolerated in reserve forests, both subsidising labour power, while increasing the subjective 
human ‘threat’ to biodiversity, which in turn continues to increase its value as a conservation 
hot spot.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified three inter-connected and complex processes of capitalist expansion 
through which access to common property ecosystems has been undermined. The decline of 
these resources has been shown to occur firstly on an ecological level due to environmental 
degradation; on an economic level, due to livelihood insecurity, debt and rising cash needs; 
and on a political level through the unequal power relations, the coercive measures of the 
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state and enclosure. The character of and relative importance of these three inter-connected 
processes in mediating the nature-society nexus in each site is intricately connected to the 
unique ways in which capitalism interacts with older economic formations.  
In Shaoguan, China, the decline in common property resources is primarily due to ecological 
change in the context of competition with large-scale resource users in this rapidly 
developing capitalist economy – although on a political level, power relations which reduce 
the fishers’ voice river basin planning remain important. The decline in common property 
resources parallels the decline in older economic formations and the gradual assimilation of 
fishers into the urban working class. 
In Phu Yen, Vietnam, the degradation of the ecosystem has also been a central process 
through which common property ecosystems have been in decline. However, degradation is 
by small scale users themselves. This is connected to internal economic stress brought about 
when the capitalism of the urban centres interacts with the older economic formations of the 
uplands, with growing local cash needs and demand from lowland markets for fish and cash 
crops. The end result is a decline in the natural resource base and a reduction in the utility of 
ecosystems to all but a few ‘accumulating’ households.  
In Buxa, India, it has not been environmental degradation which has undermined common 
property dependent livelihoods but direct exclusion on a political level through state 
sanctioned enclosure. Enclosure emerged firstly through the need for the state to corner 
natural resources to feed the capitalist primary sector of the region. More recently exclusion 
has been driven by a conservation agenda, retaining the forest as a tourist resource, while also 
facilitating the creation of a cheap labour force, subsidised in part by more restricted forest 
based livelihoods. 
The above case studies have illustrated that global processes like capitalism take specific 
local forms related to national and regional socio-economic and political systems as well as to 
the  specific historical characteristics of a region.  The three cases do however, clearly 
demonstrate a common contemporary process: the decline of the common property 
ecosystems with market globalization. Whilst recognising the different trajectories of 
capitalist development, it is evident that wholesale waged labour and subordination to market 
or commercial imperatives have resulted in fundamental changes to common property 
resources. 
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Figure 1: Map of Shaoguan field site  
 
Figure 2: Average cash income by households over last month in Shaoguan sample in 
Chinese Renminbi (Rmb) (source: survey) 
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Figure 3: Map of Phu Yen field site 
 
Figure 4: Cash income over last month by Phu Yen sampled households in Vietnamese Dong 
(VND) (source: survey) 
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Figure 5: Average expenditure over last year by Phu Yen sampled households in Vietnamese 
Dong (VND) (source: survey) 
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Figure 6: Map of buxa field site 
 
Figure 7: Average cash income by households over last month in Buxa in Indian Rupees 
(source: survey) 
 
